Abstract: We propose a model of impulsivity that predicts both domain-general and domain-specific variance in behaviours that produce short-term gratification at the expense of long-term goals and standards. Specifically, we posit that domain-general impulsivity is explained by domain-general self-control strategies and resources, whereas domain-specific impulsivity is explained by how tempting individuals find various impulsive behaviours, and to a lesser extent, in perceptions of their long-term harm. Using a novel self-report measure, factor analyses produced six (non-exhaustive) domains of impulsive behaviour (Studies 1-2): work, interpersonal relationships, drugs, food, exercise and finances. Domain-general self-control explained 40% of the variance in domain-general impulsive behaviour between individuals, r effect =.71. Domain-specific temptation (r effect =.83) and perceived harm (r effect =À.26) explained 40% and 2% of the unique within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour, respectively (59% together). In Study3, we recruited individuals in special interest groups (e.g. procrastinators) to confirm that individuals who are especially tempted by behaviours in their target domain are not likely to be more tempted in non-target domains.
On 11 December 2009 , Tiger Woods (2009 confessed publicly that he had been unfaithful to his wife and announced 'an indefinite break from professional golf' (} 3). Just over two months later, after 15 different women alleged having had an affair with him (Mueller, 2009) , Woods (2010) made a second public statement, in which he acknowledged that infidelity went against his 'core values' and that he had known at the time his actions were wrong (} 11). Still, he could not resist 'all the temptations' around him (} 11) . The news was particularly sensational given Woods's 'squeaky clean image' (Araton, 2010, } 1) , which personified 'almost fanatical self-control' (Tanenhaus, 2009, } 11) . As Surowiecki (2009) notes, 'Woods's appeal was based, ultimately, not on his physical abilities but on his mental toughness, his extraordinary capacity for focus and discipline' (} 3). Known as 'the exemplar of mental discipline' (Brooks, 2008, } 3) , Woods demonstrated remarkable self-control in many domains of life. By all accounts, Woods had an incredible work ethic that enabled him to maintain a gruelling physical training regimen. In public, he was always poised and in control of his emotions. He did not smoke, do drugs or drink heavily. Thus, it seems that Tiger Woods epitomized self-control in many arenas. Yet, he was impulsive when it came to extramarital sex.
How do we explain Tiger Woods? Is he a paragon of self-control-'the capacity for altering one's own responses, especially to bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations' (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007, p. 351 )-or the epitome of impulsivity?
1 Or, is this the wrong question to ask-is impulsive behaviour so dependent upon situational factors that it makes no sense to think about impulsivity in domaingeneral terms? The current investigation addresses these questions. We propose and test a model that explains both domain-general and domain-specific variance in impulsive behaviour. Our approach was as follows. First, we used factor analyses to identify (Study1a) and confirm (Study1b) distinct domains of impulsive behaviour. Then, we tested whether between-individual domain-general impulsivity could be explained by domain-general self-control, and whether within-individual variation in impulsivity across domains could be explained by corresponding differences in the subjective temptation and perceived harm of these behaviours (Study2). Finally, we recruited individuals in special interest groups (e.g. procrastinators, impulse shoppers) from a social networking website to confirm that temptation is domain specific (Study3).
Domain-general and domain-specific aspects of personality
It is now generally recognized that behaviour is both domain general and domain specific (Epstein & O'Brien, 1985) , 2 and we do not claim that either domain-general or domainspecific processes are 'stronger' than the other in this paper. Nonetheless, some historical context on the general versus specific debate would frame our investigation.
Whether situational factors or domain-general personality traits hold the upper hand in determining behaviour has been fiercely debated since Mischel's (1968) controversial monograph, Personality and Assessment. Reviewing the extant literature on domain generality in personality, Mischel (1968) concluded, 'Although behavior patterns often may be stable, they usually are not highly generalized across situations ' (p. 282) . Some psychologists, notably those in the social psychology tradition, have since questioned the utility of domain-general personality traits. Ross and Nisbett (1991) , for instance, suggested, 'Manipulations of the social situation can overwhelm in importance the type of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally think of as being determinative of social behavior ' (p. 14) .
Three sources of empirical evidence argue convincingly against an extreme situationist explanation for impulsive behaviour. First, Baumeister and colleagues have shown in laboratory studies that factors determining self-controlled behaviour are, at least to some extent, domain general Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) . In a typical experiment, exerting self-control in one domain is shown to impair subsequent attempts to exercise self-control in other domains. For instance, suppressing emotions diminishes physical stamina, suppressing an unwanted thought decreases the ability to suppress emotions, and refraining from eating warm chocolate chip cookies reduces persistence in working on problem-solving tasks .
Second, personality psychologists who study impulsivity have succeeded in predicting theoretically relevant and objectively measured life outcomes using domain-general personality questionnaire items such as 'I am self-disciplined'. For example, in prospective, longitudinal studies in which socio-economic background and general intelligence were controlled, domain-general questionnaire measures of impulsivity in childhood have been shown to predict decreases in report card grades (Duckworth, Tsukayama, & May, 2010) , unhealthy weight gain (Duckworth, Tsukayama, & Geier, 2010; Tsukayama, Toomey, Faith, & Duckworth, 2010) and informant ratings of substance abuse and government records of criminal convictions (Moffitt et al., 2011) .
Finally, Mischel himself has shown in a series of experiments that self-control in young children is facilitated by domain-general metacognitive strategies (Mischel & Mendoza-Denton, 2003) . For example, in the preschool delay of gratification task, children cued to dwell on the 'cool' features of rewards (e.g. 'If you want to, when you want to, you can think about how the marshmallows look like white puffy clouds') were able to wait twice as long as children cued to dwell on their consummatory, 'hot' features (e.g. 'If you want to, when you want to, you can think about how sweet and chewy the marshmallows taste') (Mischel & Baker, 1975) . The same psychological distancing strategy has been shown to facilitate self-control in other domains, including emotion regulation (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, in press; Ochsner & Gross, 2004) . Strategies that reduce the hedonic pull of temptations-for example, by manipulating their salience or representationshould in theory be deployable in any domain (Carlson & Beck, in press; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003) . Indeed, children who can wait longer in the preschool delay of gratification task grow up to be more competent across health, interpersonal, academic and work domains (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) . Hence, ceteris paribus, individuals equipped with these strategies should be more self-controlled across all domains.
And yet, Tiger Woods and many less famous individuals defy easy categorization as either impulsive or self-controlled. In practice, most personality questionnaire items (e.g. 'I am self-disciplined') are domain general in the sense that they do not explicitly specify context. The omission of explicit target situations requires the respondent to consider his overall level of behaviour. One can imagine a respondent whose self-control is extraordinary when it comes to finishing work assignments on time but minimal when it comes to kicking a smoking habit; faced with a question on his or her overall level of self-control, this individual might say 'moderate'. Mischel and Shoda (1995) have pointed out that such practices implicitly treat domain-specific deviations from mean levels of behaviour as error or noise.
As Mischel himself advocated, both in his 1968 monograph and in more recent writings (e.g. Mischel, 2004) , the search for coherence in personality lies not in the negation of the situation but in its active study. In doing so-and, specifically, in examining patterns of behaviour that are consistent across certain types of situations-we might 'reconcile the variability of the individual's behavior across situations with our intuitive conviction that each individual is characterized by stable and distinctive qualities' (Mischel, 2009, p. 284) . This nuanced, moderate position-and the need to examine within-individual differences in behaviour-has also been advocated by other leaders in personality psychology (Fleeson, 2001 (Fleeson, , 2007 Funder, 2009; Lucas & Donnellan, 2009; Roberts, 2007) . Still, empirical efforts that focus on domain specificity in personality remain rare: 'Despite the intrinsic contextualized nature of personality traits, the measurement of situations is typically tossed unceremoniously into the black box of the personality trait inventory' (Roberts, 2007 (Roberts, , p. 1077 . Domain-specific 'if-then' profiles of behaviour patterns (e.g. if Woods is in the sex domain, then he is likely to give into temptation, but if he is in the work domain, then he is likely to act self-controlled) should improve predictive validity and, more importantly, provide a deeper understanding of individual differences in impulsivity.
A model of impulsive behaviour
Our model of impulsive behaviour begins with the assumption that individuals are often faced with two mutually exclusive options. The impulsive choice brings immediate gratification with deferred negative consequences (e.g. eating a big piece of chocolate cake right now brings immediate pleasure but also regret and worse health later on), whereas the self-controlled choice brings greater utility but only after some delay (e.g. not eating the cake brings no pleasure now but better physical health later on). Deciding between indulgence and abstinence requires a subjective evaluation of the gratification associated with the choice as well as some consideration of the attendant long-term consequences (i.e. harm).
We propose that subjective temptation and perceived harm are psychologically meaningful aspects of impulsive behaviour that can explain domain specificity. Specifically, we suggest that both subjective temptation and perceived harm are domain specific, whereas willpower resources and strategies are domain general.
3 Consistent with the empirical work by Baumeister and colleagues, we assume the processes that underpin the inhibition of impulses to rely on resources that are finite and therefore judiciously allocated. The 'cost' of resisting any temptation can be dramatically reduced by cognitive and behavioural strategies (e.g. mental transformation). Thus, our model predicts both domain-general and domain-specific variance in impulsive behaviour. Individuals who are more self-controlled, generally, than others have more self-control resources to deploy and more effective strategies for reducing the cost of resisting temptation. Consequently, their overall level of impulsive behaviour will be lower than their less self-controlled peers ( Figure 1a ). In contrast, an individual's observed behaviour will vary across domains as a function of his or her idiosyncratic, domainspecific subjective evaluations of temptation and perceived harm (Figure 1b) .
Returning to our early example, Tiger Woods might have prodigious self-control resources and effective strategies for reducing the cost of resisting temptation. But, relative to other temptations that Woods did successfully resist, the particular improprieties, which were Woods's undoing, must have elicited exceptionally strong urges and/or have been evaluated as benign.
Our model is consistent with Hofmann, Friese, and Strack's (2009) dual-system model of self-control where self-control outcomes (i.e. impulsive behaviour) are predicted by impulsive precursors (e.g. temptation) and reflective precursors (e.g. perceived harm). In their model, the impulsive system does not only produce impulses that lead to detrimental behaviour. Some impulses (e.g. drinking water when one is thirsty) are aligned with the reflective system. In addition, impulsive behaviour may consist of inaction (e.g. procrastinating or not exercising), and the reflective system may be required to override the impulse to be inactive. Their model also predicts that 'boundary conditions' (e.g. domain-general self-control) moderate the effects of impulsive and reflective precursors on behaviour. Research applying their model has focused on between-individual differences within a domain, whereas our investigation focuses on within-individual differences across domains.
Our model is also consistent with Fleeson's (2001) density distribution approach. From this perspective, traits can be thought of as density distributions of states, which are characterized by distribution moments (e.g. mean, variance, skew and kurtosis). As a resolution to the person-situation debate, Fleeson demonstrated that 'trait concepts are inclusive of both impressive levels of within-person stability and impressive levels of within-person variability' (p. 1011). Specifically, he showed that although marked within-individual 3 Our model is inspired by research on domain specificity in risk-taking by Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) . Like most traits, risk aversion has traditionally been assumed by economists and psychologists alike to be domain general, despite abundant empirical evidence that risk-taking behaviour varies across domains (e.g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990) . Weber et al. (2002) found that 'domain differences in apparent risk taking seem to be associated primarily with differences in the perception of the activities' benefits and risks' (p. 282). variance exists (and single states demonstrate relatively low test-retest stability), their means are highly stable (rs>.90). Relevant to the current investigation, Fleeson made a distinction between structural and process approaches: 'The structural approach emphasizes broad tendencies that are manifest in stable and situation-independent behavioral averages. The process approach emphasizes laws relating situational conditions to individuals' behavioral reactions. . . The structural approach can focus on correlates of highly reliable means, and the process approach can explain the plentiful deviations from these means' (p. 1023). Our model encompasses and applies both of these approaches.
The present studies
The goals of this investigation were to (i) substantiate distinct domains of impulsive behaviour and (ii) explain within-individual variance across domains as a function of the subjective temptation and perceived harm of impulsive behaviour. In Study1a, we developed the Domain-specific Impulsivity Scale (DSIS), administered the DSIS to a large sample of undergraduates and conducted exploratory factor analyses to assess the dimensionality of the scale. In Study 1b, we refined the DSIS and conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) on a national Internet sample of adults. In Study2, we tested the hypothesis that variance in domainspecific impulsive behaviour could be explained by temptation and perceived harm. In Study3, we used targeted subsamples to confirm that individuals who are highly tempted in one domain (e.g. dieters in the food domain) are only moderately tempted in other domains (e.g. impulse shoppers in the finance domain).
STUDY 1A
In Study1a, we developed and validated a novel self-report questionnaire of domain-specific impulsive behaviour. We used exploratory factor analyses to test the hypothesis that impulsive behaviour is multidimensional. To establish convergent validity, we analysed correlations between impulsive behaviour in each domain and a domain-general self-control scale, and to test criterion-related validity, we conducted multiple regression analyses predicting measures of academic achievement, positive social relations, physical health and facets of impulsivity from domain-specific impulsive behaviour.
We predicted that (i) exploratory factor analyses would produce domain-specific factors; (ii) impulsive behaviour within each domain would show convergent validity with a widely used self-control scale (i.e. negatively correlated); (iii) domain-specific impulsive behaviour would show convergent validity with outcomes theoretically predicted to vary with specific domains [e.g. work with grade point average (GPA)]; (iv) domain-specific impulsive behaviour would provide incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting theoretically relevant outcomes; and (v) the variance in domain-specific impulsive behaviour within individuals will be significantly larger than domaingeneral impulsive behaviour between individuals.
Method

Participants
Two hundred ninety-three undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at a large, private university participated in this study for research experience credit (M=19.5 years, SD=1.3; 56.6% women). Approximately 64.5% of the participants were White people, 18.1% were Asian, 5.5% were Latino, 4.4% were Black people and 7.5% were either of mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds.
Procedure and measures
We posted this study online and advertised it on the psychology department's subject pool website as a survey of personality and behaviour. To obviate order effects, we randomized the sequence of DSIS items for each participant. In addition to the DSIS items, participants completed a domain-general measure of self-control and answered questions about their physical health, social relationships, demographic characteristics and GPA.
Domain-specific impulsive behaviour. Sixty-eight items were generated in 10 domains of impulsivity: alcohol, emotion, exercise, finance, food, relationship, media, sex, smoking and work. We generated items through focus groups instructed to nominate behaviours that reflect impulsivity or self-control and, in addition, by examining existing measures of impulsivity and self-control (e.g. Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001 ). Although we strived to include a broad sample, the items in this investigation were not an exhaustive set of impulsive behaviours. For instance, road rage and speeding are not represented. However, exhaustive coverage was not necessary for our goals of (i) demonstrating that impulsive behaviour varies across domains and (ii) examining potential explanations for domain specificity. The DSIS instructed participants to 'indicate the likelihood of engaging in the following' on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=very unlikely to 5=very likely (see Appendix for the full set of instructions).
Domain-general self-control. The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS; Tangney et al., 2004 ) is a 13-item self-report questionnaire. Participants rated how well each item (e.g. 'I am good at resisting temptation') described them on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=not at all like me to 5=very much like me. The observed internal reliability was .84.
Health and positive social relations. We included three questions to assess physical health-'I am healthy', 'I am in great physical shape' and 'Physically, I feel great'-and three questions to assess positive social relations-'People like me', 'I have a lot of friends' and 'I get along well with others'. These items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. The three health items had an internal reliability coefficient of .86, and the three social relations items had an internal reliability coefficient of .83.
Facets of impulsivity. The Urgency, (lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance and Sensation Seeking (UPPS) Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001 ) is a 45-item self-report questionnaire. Participants rated how well each item described them on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=not at all like me to 5 =very much like me. Sample items include 'I have trouble controlling my impulses' for the Urgency subscale, 'I usually think carefully before doing anything' for the (lack of) Premeditation subscale, 'I finish what I start' for the (lack of) Perseverance subscale, and 'I generally seek new and exciting experiences and sensations' for the Sensation Seeking subscale. The observed internal reliabilities ranged from .85 to .91.
Results and discussion
Exploratory factor analysis
We reduced the number of items to 50 (see Table 1 for the final set of items) by removing items that either had less than a .40 corrected item-total correlation within their subscale or were theoretically expected to load in more than one domain (e.g. 'watching pornographic movies' was related to both sex and media). Exploratory factor analyses on this set of 50 items suggested six domain-specific factors, which were interpretable as impulsive behaviour in the work, relationship, drug, food, exercise and finance domains. We used the squared multiple correlation method to compute the prior communality estimates, set the factor loading criteria at .40 and used an orthogonal varimax rotation. We used a combination of scree and parallel tests, the Kaiser criterion, the minimum average partial criterion and the interpretability of the factors to determine the number of factors to extract. The final solution is shown in Table 1 , and the subscale means, SDs and intercorrelations are shown in Table 2 . 4 Domain-specific Impulsivity Scale convergent, criterion and incremental predictive validities As predicted, domain-general self-control was significantly negatively correlated with impulsive behaviour within each of the six domains, rs from À.26 to À.64, ps<.001 (Table 2 ). We also predicted that impulsive work behaviour would correlate negatively with GPA, impulsive relationship behaviour would correlate negatively with social relations, and impulsive (lack of) exercise and food behaviour would correlate negatively with health. As shown in Table 2 , the results supported our predictions. Overall, domain-specific impulsivity scores predicted these theoretically related outcomes (average r=À.25) better than they predicted theoretically unrelated outcomes (average r=À.09).
5
Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the DSIS subscales provided incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting theoretically relevant outcomes in three out of four analyses. The domainspecific food (b=À.16, part r=À.16, p<.01), exercise (b=À.44, part r=À.40, p<.001) and relationship subscales (b=À.15, part r=À.13, p<.05) provided incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting health (for the food and exercise domains) and positive social relations (for the relation domain). The work subscale did not provide incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting GPA, b=À.01, part r=À.01, NS. This occurred because of the relatively large amount of variance shared between the work subscale and the self-control scale (r 2 =.41). Indeed, several items on the self-control scale relate directly to work (e.g. 'I am lazy'), and the work subscale had the strongest correlation (r=À.64) with the self-control scale. 6 Domain-specific Impulsivity Scale correspondence with Urgency, (lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance and Sensation Seeking Scale Domain-specific impulsive behaviour demonstrated theoretically predicted relationships with facets of impulsivity. We predicted that UPPS Urgency would be associated with impulsive interpersonal, drug, food and finance behaviour because urgency involves impulses (such as for saying things and buying things on impulse) and cravings (such as for food and drugs). We predicted that UPPS (lack of) Premeditation would be associated with interpersonal and finance behaviour because premeditation involves thinking carefully before saying things and planning for the future. We predicted that UPPS Perseverance would be associated with work and exercise behaviour because perseverance is necessary to finish arduous and boring work tasks as well as many forms of exercise. Finally, we predicted that UPPS Sensation Seeking would be associated with drug behaviour because drug use has been connected with sensation seeking (Donohew et al., 1999; Robbins & Bryan, 2004) . As shown in Table 2 , the results supported our predictions. Overall, UPPS subscales predicted theoretically related DSIS subscales (average r=.29) better than they predicted theoretically unrelated DSIS subscales (average r=.10).
Hierarchical linear model A hierarchical linear model [HLM; estimated with the programme HLM 6.08 (SSI, Lincolnwood, IL, USA)] revealed that the variance in domain-specific impulsive behaviour within individuals was significantly larger than domain-general impulsive behaviour between individuals.
7 At level1, the outcome 5 These averages were computed using Fisher's r to z formula to convert rs to zs, averaging the zs, then converting the average zs back to rs. By 'larger', we refer to the point estimates. We are not aware of an inferential test that can compare average rs computed with the same variables within the same sample. However, in this sample, a correlation of r=.25 is significant at p<.001, whereas a correlation of r=.09 is not significant. 6 The participants, being students, may have considered the work domain to exemplify impulsivity because schoolwork is salient. As a result, they may have subjectively overemphasized the work domain when rating the domain-general items (e.g. 'I wish I had more self-discipline'). 7 Comparing variance components at different levels is one of the main applications of multilevel analyses (Bickel, 2007; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003) . The interpretation is equivalent to thinking about variance partitioning in a between-subjects ANOVA: is there more variance between groups versus within groups? Imagine that 99% of the variance in impulsive behaviour was within individuals across domains and that only 1% was between individuals. This would suggest that most of the variance in impulsive behaviour is across domains (i.e. an individual can be highly impulsive in one domain but not in others) and that there is relatively little variance between individuals (i.e. it does not make sense to say that one individual is generally more impulsive than the other). Conversely, if we had found that 1% of the variance were within individuals across domains and that 99% were between individuals, then that would suggest that impulsive behaviour for a particular individual does not vary across domains (i.e. if an individual is impulsive in one domain, then he or she is impulsive in others as well), but there are reliable differences in impulsivity among individuals (i.e. if an individual is impulsive, then he or she is generally more impulsive in all domains compared with other individuals).
variable was the domain-specific behaviour subscales of the DSIS, with six measures (one for each domain) nested within each participant (n=293) for a total of 1758 data points. Participants were the level-2 units. In this unconditional (i.e. no predictor/s) model, behaviour in domain d for individual i (Y di ) is a function of the grand mean (g 00 ), deviation from the grand mean by individual i (z 0i ), and deviation from indi-
The within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains (.68; 79% of the total variance) was significantly larger than the between-individual variance (.18; 21% of the total variance; F(1465, 292)=3.79, p<.001), which indicates that most of the variance in impulsive behaviour is within individuals and provides further evidence that impulsive behaviour is domain specific.
STUDY 1B
Study1a provided preliminary support for distinct domains of impulsive behaviour. In Study1b, we replicated and extended our findings in a large sample of adults recruited through the Internet. We revised the DSIS instructions so that participants were asked to 'indicate how often you do the following' on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=never to 5=very often instead of the more hypothetical 'indicate the likelihood of engaging in the following'. We revised the DSIS so that the remaining items represented more concrete or observable behaviour [e.g. we removed 'envying others' and revised 'being greedy' to 'taking more than my fair share (i.e., being greedy)'], were less ambiguous (e.g. we changed 'telling secrets' to 'telling another person's secret') and were less complex (e.g. we changed 'being sedentary instead of exercising' to 'being sedentary'). When possible, we revised common initial verbs (e.g. 'eating' for the food items) to decrease inflated common source variance. To reduce social desirability effects, we made an effort to revise or remove items that had negative connotations (e.g. 'behaving inappropriately when I am emotional' was removed); admittedly, this attempt was not fully successful as several items that could be construed as negative were retained (e.g. 'lying' and 'procrastinating'). Finally, we added three new items to the relationship domain, two to the finance domain and one to the drug domain to increase internal reliability. The full set of revised items is presented in Table 3 .
Method
Participants
Fourteen hundred eighty-six adults participated in this study (M=41.1years, SD=12.7; 79.2% women). Approximately 79.9% of the participants were White people, 7.5% were Asian, 5% were Latino, 3.6% were Black people and 4% were either of mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds.
Procedure and measures
We posted this study online and set up a link on the website www.authentichappiness.com, inviting visitors to participate in research on domain-specific self-control. This non-commercial website provides free information about psychology research, access to self-report measures and opportunities to participate in research. To obviate order effects, the sequence of DSIS items were randomized for each participant. In addition to the DSIS items, participants filled in the BSCS (observed a=.83) and a demographic questionnaire, which included items about gender, ethnicity, year of birth, height and weight. We used the height and weight information to compute body mass index (BMI) scores. 
Confirmatory factor analyses
We used CFA to compare the fit of a domain-specific sixfactor model with a domain-general one-factor model. In the six-factor model, items were allowed to load freely on their respective factor (domain), the factor loadings with other factors were set to zero, and the covariances among the factors were freely estimated (Table 3 ). In the one-factor model, all items were allowed to load freely on a single factor. In both models, the factors were scaled by setting the variance to equal to 1.0. A chi-square difference test indicated that the domainspecific six-factor model fits the data better than the domaingeneral one-factor model, w 2 (15, n=1486)=15389.39, p<.001. Fit indices suggested an adequate fit to the data for the six-factor CFA model: w 2 (1209, n=1486)=7740.65, p<.001; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) =.060 (90% confidence interval=.059 to .062); Comparative Fit Index (CFI)=.82; and standardized root mean residual (SRMR)=.06 (for a discussion of fit indices, see Kline, 2005 Domain-specific Impulsivity Scale convergent, criterion and incremental predictive validities Domain-general self-control was negatively correlated with impulsive behaviour in each of the six domains (Table 4) . Food and (lack of) exercise domain-specific impulsivity scores predicted BMI (average r=.38) better than theoretically unrelated domain-specific scores (average r=.06). Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the food (b=.34, part r=.32, p<.001) and (lack of) exercise (b=.35, part r=.31, p<.001) DSIS subscales provided incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting BMI.
Hierarchical linear model
The within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains (.68; 88% of the total variance) was significantly larger than the between-individual variance (.09; 12% of the total variance; F(7430, 1485)=7.48, p<.001), which again indicates that most of the variance in impulsive behaviour is within individuals.
STUDY 2
Study1a and 1b provided evidence for distinct domains of impulsive behaviour. In Study2, we tested our theory that within-individual differences in domain-specific impulsive behaviours could be largely explained by domain-specific differences in their subjective temptation and perceived harm. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that individual differences in the effects of temptation and perceived harm would predict individual differences in within-individual variability in domain-specific behaviour. As Fleeson (2001) explains, 'being sensitive to the cues for a particular trait would result in the individual acting more variably on that trait, in particular. That is, a person whose actions differ from each other on a trait may be a person who responds strongly to the momentary cues for that trait' (p. 1014). He goes on to say, 'If within-person variability in behavior is partially due to sensitivity to trait-relevant cues, then individual differences in within-person variability may be due to individual differences in sensitivity to trait-relevant cues' (p. 1019). In addition to sensitivity to cues (i.e. the individual-specific effects of temptation and perceived harm), we also predicted that within-individual variability in domain-specific temptation and perceived harm as well as their interactions with their effects (e.g. individual-specific effects of temptation with within-individual variability in domain-specific temptation) would predict within-individual variability in domain-specific impulsive behaviour. The rationale is that if within-individual variability in domain-specific impulsive behaviour is due to corresponding variability in temptation and perceived harm, then individual differences in the effects of temptation and perceived harm, within-individual variability in temptation and perceived harm, and the variability by effect interactions should predict within-individual variability in domain-specific impulsive behaviour.
Method
Participants
Three hundred fifty-three undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at a large, private university participated in this study for research experience credit (M=20.3 years, SD=2.7; 64.6% women). Approximately 59.8% of the participants were White people, 19.8% were Asian, 5.9% were Latino, 4.8% were Black people and 9.7% were either of mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds.
Procedure and measures
We posted this study online and advertised it on the psychology department's subject pool website as a survey of personality and behaviour. To avoid order effects, we randomized the sequence of DSIS items within each scale for each participant. In addition to the DSIS items, participants filled in the BSCS described in Study1a and a demographic questionnaire. We used the DSIS revision described in Study1b in this study. However, in addition to the behaviour scale (DSIS-B), the same set of 51 DSIS items was presented two more times, with different prompts each time, to gauge temptation and perceived harm. For the temptation scale (DSIS-T), participants were asked to 'please rate how tempted you would be to do the following' on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=not tempted at all to 5=very tempting. For the perceived-harm scale (DSIS-H), participants were asked to 'rate how bad you think the following activities are' on a 5-point scale ranging from 1=not bad at all to 5=very bad. See Appendix for the full set of instructions and anchors. Alphas ranged from .81 to .94, average=.88 (Table 5) .
Results and discussion
Confirmatory factor analyses A chi-square difference test indicated that the domainspecific six-factor model of impulsive behaviour fits the data better than the domain-general one-factor model, w 
Hierarchical linear models
Hierarchical linear models revealed that the variance in domain-specific impulsive behaviour within individuals was significantly larger than domain-general impulsive behaviour between individuals and that temptation predicted substantially more unique variance in withinindividual domain-specific impulsive behaviour than perceived harm, although both were significant predictors. We first fit an unconditional model (model1) to provide an estimate of the proportion of total variance within and between individuals in impulsive behaviour and serve as a baseline model to compare the reduction in variance among the more complex models. Subsequent models examined the amount of within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains explained by temptation (model2), perceived harm (model3) and temptation and perceived harm (model4). In model5, we added domain-general self-control as a level-2 predictor to explain between-individual variance in domain-general impulsive behaviour and to examine whether domain-general selfcontrol moderated the within-individual effects of temptation and perceived harm. We individual-mean centred the level-1 predictors and grand-mean centred the level-2 predictors (for a discussion of centring, see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) .
Model 1 (see Equation (la), (lb), (lc) and Table 6 ) revealed that the within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains (.54; 87% of the total variance) was significantly larger than the between-individual variance (.08; 13% of the total variance; F(1765, 352)=6.78, p<.001). In model 2, we included temptation as a level-1 predictor of impulsive behaviour to examine the amount of variance explained by temptation alone.
Level 2À Between individual :
The pseudo-R 2 e (Singer & Willett, 2003) was .57, which indicated that adding temptation as a level-1 predictor accounted for 57% of the within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains. This model also provided an estimate of the average slope (across individuals) of temptation: .58, t(352)=32.15, p<.001, r effect =.86.
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In model 3, we removed temptation and added perceived harm as a level-1 predictor of impulsive behaviour.
The pseudo-R 2 e was .19, and the estimated average slope (across individuals) of perceived harm was À.35, t(352)= À11.54, p<.001, r effect =À.52.
In model 4, we added temptation and perceived harm simultaneously as level-1 predictors of impulsive behaviour.
Combined model :
The pseudo-R 2 e was .59. Temptation and perceived harm explained 40% and 2% of the unique within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour, respectively. The average slopes (across individuals) of temptation controlling for perceived harm, and perceived harm controlling for temptation were .53, t(352)=27.69, p<.001, r effect =.83, and À.10, t(352)=À4.82, p<.001, r effect =À.25, respectively. The variance components for the slopes of temptation (.05, w 2 (344)= 570.24, p<.001) and perceived harm (.03, w 2 (344)=396.70, p=.026) suggested that the effects of temptation and perceived harm ranged from about .09 to .98 and from À.45 to .24, respectively, for 95% of the participants. Temptation was a significantly better predictor than perceived harm, t(352)=19.05, p<.001.
In model 5, we added self-control as a level-2 predictor of the intercept, temptation slope and perceived harm slope. Because the level-1 predictors were individual-mean centred, the level-1 intercept represented each individual's average (or domain-general) level of impulsive behaviour.
9 Following Karney and Bradbury (1997) , we used the following formula to compute the effect-size correlations: r effect =√[t 2 /(t 2 +df)]. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All of the fixed components and between-individual variance components were significant at p<.001, except for the self-controlÂtemptation fixed component in model5 (p<.05) and the variance component of the perceived-harm slope in models4 (p<.05) and 5 (NS). † Variable was individual-mean centred. { Self-control was between-individual grand-mean centred.
The pseudo-R 2 z0 indicated that adding self-control as a level-2 predictor of the level-1 intercept accounted for approximately 40% of the domain-general variance in impulsive behaviour between individuals. The slope of self-control was À.49, t(351)=À18.84, p<.001, r effect =À.71. As predicted, between-individual domain-general self-control moderated the within-individual effects of temptation (À.08, t(351)=À2.37, p<.05, r effect =À.13) and perceived harm (À.19, t(351)=À5.90, p<.001, r effect =À.30) on impulsive behaviour, indicating that temptation has less of an effect and perceived harm has a greater effect on impulsive behaviour for individuals with more self-control. More specifically, these cross-level interactions indicate that the effects of temptation and perceived harm are .45 and À.30, respectively, for individuals who are one point above the mean on self-control, whereas the same effects are .61 and .08 for individuals who are one point below the mean. Pseudo-R 2 z1
and pseudo-R 2 z2 indicated that adding self-control as a level-2 predictor of the level-1 temptation and perceived harm slopes explained about 6% and 46% of the between-individual variance of the within-individual effects of temptation and perceived harm, respectively.
Finally, we tested our hypothesized predictors of individual differences in within-individual variability in domain-specific behaviour. In step1 of a hierarchical regression analysis, the effects of temptation (b=.66, p<.001) and perceived harm (b=.18, p<.001) as well as within-individual variability in domain-specific temptation (b=.44, p<.001) and perceived harm (b=.12, p=.001) predicted individual differences in within-individual variability in domain-specific behaviour.
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In step2, the temptation effect by temptation variability interaction (b=.07, p=.064) and the perceived harm effect by perceived harm variability interaction (b=.08, p=.02) were added and found to be marginally significant and significant, respectively.
STUDY 3
Collectively, the first three studies provided evidence for both domain-specific and domain-general aspects of impulsive behaviour. In Study2, we found evidence that individuals vary dramatically in their ability to exercise self-control across domains primarily because they find some activities more tempting than others. To confirm the hypothesis that temptation is highly domain specific (i.e. what is tempting to one individual can hold no appeal whatsoever to another), in Study 3, inspired by Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke's (2006) study on domain specificity in participant recruitment, we recruited targeted subsamples from www.facebook.com, a social networking website.
Facebook is a free online community with over 200 million users and provides its members with tools for interacting with friends, colleagues and family members. In addition, it allows members to connect with other individuals who share specific common interests through 30 million special interest groups. Members can find and join groups by searching their names and descriptions by using key words or phrases. We expected members of targeted interest groups to deem relevant temptations to be particularly attractive or enjoyable. For instance, shopaholics should be more tempted to engage in impulse buying but not more tempted to drink or avoid exercise.
In sum, we hypothesized that (i) targeted subsamples would be more tempted in the hypothesized domain relative to the other groups and (ii) subsamples would not differ in their overall levels of temptation. In addition to providing further evidence for convergent and discriminant validities, this study is noteworthy in that it examines real-world behaviour (i.e. membership in domain-specific groups), uses a diverse sample (i.e. not just college students) and demonstrates the utility of using the Internet for psychological research.
Method
Participants Four hundred nineteen adult participants (M=25.1years, SD=8.1; 77% women) were recruited from the work domain (n=152), the food domain (n=61), the finance domain (n=102), the drug and alcohol domain (n=78) and the exercise domain (n=26).
Procedure and measures
We used key words and phrases to identify special interest groups in five domains:
11 work (e.g. 'experts of procrastination'), food (e.g. 'binge eating group'), finance (e.g. 'addicted to shopping'), drug and alcohol (e.g. 'wreckless drinking') and exercise (e.g. 'I hate exercise'). Key terms used to identify special interest groups included the following-work: procrastinators, procrastination; food: dieters, binge eaters, weight loss, I love eating, I eat too much; finance: shopaholics, shopping addiction, I love shopping; drug and alcohol: alcoholics, drinking, binge drinking, alcohol, beer, shots, black out; and exercise: exercise, fitness, couch potato. Once special interest groups were identified, we contacted the group administrators for permission to invite their members to participate in our study. Group administrators either forwarded our invitation or let us message their members directly. We invited members to participate in our study 'on personality, lifestyle and behaviour' and directed them to five separate (but identical) websites.
12 Importantly, we did not mention in our invitation or on the study website itself our interest in domain specificity or impulsivity per se. Participants completed the DSIS-T scale, as well as a demographics questionnaire.
Results and discussion
As predicted, within each domain, the target group was more tempted to engage in domain-specific impulsive behaviour relative to the other groups but not more tempted overall. Specifically, a 5(domain)Â5(group) mixed-design ANOVA predicting temptation revealed a significant main effect for domain (F(4, 1656)=126.04, p<.001) and a significant domain by group interaction (F(16, 1656) =12.76, p<.001) but no effect for group (F(4, 414)=1.15, p=.33). As summarized in Figure 2 and Tables 7 and 8, the differences between target groups and other groups were all significant and ranged from small to large in effect size. Overall, these results suggest that individuals are in 'impulsive-problem' groups because of domain-specific temptation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This investigation presents support for our proposed model of impulsivity. Some individuals are more impulsive than others on average, and the tendency to be impulsive in one domain (e.g. finances) correlates with the tendency to be impulsive in other domains (e.g. food and drugs). But, it is also true that any given individual varies dramatically in how gratifying he or she finds particular activities and, consequently, in the relative frequency with which he or she indulges in them. In contrast, within-individual differences in the perceived harm associated with indulging explain only minimal unique variance in within-individual differences in impulsive behaviour. Moreover, as predicted, temptation has less of an effect on individuals who were more self-controlled than others in general, and these individuals were also less likely to engage in behaviours deemed harmful.
When submitted to exploratory factor analyses, the scale we developed for this investigation produced distinct, interpretable factors. Likewise, domain-specific confirmatory factor models fit the data better than domain-general (i.e. one factor) models of impulsive behaviour. The DSIS subscales demonstrated convergent validity with a widely used domain-general measure of self-control and incremental predictive validity above and beyond this domain-general measure for theoretically relevant outcomes (e.g. impulsive behaviour in the food domain predicted BMI over and beyond a domain-general self-control questionnaire). Finally, in Studies 1a, 1b and 2, the within-individual variance in impulsive behaviour across domains (i.e. domain-specific behaviour) was significantly larger than the domain-general variance across individuals.
Individuals behaved more impulsively in domains that they found tempting and, to a much lesser extent, resisted vices that they perceived as harmful. Specifically, temptation and perceived harm together explained 59% of the withinindividual variance across domains, whereas temptation explained 40% of the unique variance compared with 2% for perceived harm. On its own, temptation explained most of the variance (57%) in domain-specific impulsive behaviour. As predicted by the model of Hofmann et al. (2009) , temptation had a weaker effect and perceived harm had a stronger effect for individuals with higher self-control; that is, more self-controlled individuals are better at overcoming their idiosyncratic temptations and refraining from behaviours that they deem harmful. Finally, consistent with the idea that domain-specific impulsive behaviour is partially due to domain-specific temptation and perceived harm, individuals with greater sensitivity to temptation and perceived harm and who had more variability in domain-specific temptation and perceived harm had more variance in impulsive behaviour across domains. Why does perceived harm account for relatively little variance in impulsive behaviour? Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) proposed that there are two systems that influence impulsivity: a hot emotional system that is fast and reflexive and a cool cognitive system that is slow and reflective. Visceral hot influences can have powerful effects that overwhelm the cool system (Loewenstein, 1996) . If temptation reflects the hot system and perceived harm reflects the cool system, then temptation may have a greater influence on impulsive behaviour than perceived harm. Another explanation is that individuals may generally be more consistent in evaluating harm versus temptation. Thus, there may be relatively little variance in perceived harm to explain variance in impulsive behaviour. Indeed, in Study2, estimates for the withinindividual variance across domains were .82 for temptation and .46 for perceived harm (in separate unconditional HLM models with temptation and perceived harm as outcomes; results are not reported).
Our findings are consistent with recent research on domain specificity in risk-taking by Weber and colleagues (Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002) . Like most traits, risk aversion has traditionally been assumed by economists to be domain general, despite evidence that risk-taking behaviour varies across domains (e.g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990) . Weber et al. (2002) found that 'domain differences in apparent risk taking seem to be associated primarily with differences in the perception of the activities' benefits and risks ' (p. 282) . Notably, Weber and colleagues found content domains of risk that did not correspond with our domains of impulsivity. This suggests that impulsivity and risk do not conform to universal 'life domains'. More generally, we speculate that psychologically meaningful boundaries that demarcate domains vary across personality traits.
Although it is possible that domain-specific impulsecontrol systems or the opportunity to engage in impulsive behaviour explains domain specificity, this study suggests that domain-general self-control combined with domain-specific temptation (and other potential factors) can give rise to domain-specific impulsive behaviour. This is congruent with Mischel's (1973) proposal that an individual's 'inconsistent' behaviour across domains is a function of the individual's construal of the situation. If an individual subjectively perceives temptation to be high (or harm to be low), then that individual is more likely to engage in impulsive behaviour.
Limitations
We see four limitations of the current investigation. First, we relied exclusively on self-report questionnaires, which are susceptible to response biases, such as social desirability and acquiescence (Paulhus, 1991) . Although these biases could inflate correlations between scales, they could also increase the difficulty of finding distinct factors as exploratory factor analysis depends on differential variance. A related issue is that the relationship between self-report behaviour and attitudes may be spuriously inflated (Bem, 1967) . For example, if individuals say that they eat fried food often and then are asked if they like fried food, then they might decide (perhaps unconsciously) that they must like fried food if they eat it often. Against this possibility, the construct of self-control (i.e. avoiding behaviours that one finds tempting but regards as harmful versus engaging in tempting behaviours that are deemed harmful) suggests that individuals can distinguish between temptation, perceived harm and behaviour. For instance, one may avoid procrastination yet still be tempted to procrastinate: that is, the temptation and the behaviour are distinct. Finally, the scale anchors (e.g. 'very tempting') were subjective and open to interpretation. 13 Because these are common limitations to questionnaire-based research, further studies should investigate domain-specific impulsivity through alternative methods, such as using implicit measures to assess temptation.
The second limitation of this investigation pertains to content-related validity. We reiterate that the items in this investigation were not an exhaustive set of impulsive behaviours, and thus, all possible domains were not included. Because the results of exploratory factor analyses are dependent on the included items, researchers with different items might obtain different results. Consequently, these results must be interpreted with caution as a study using a different set of items might not find coherent domain-specific factors. Moreover, the domains included in this investigation may vary in their bandwidth and level of specificity. For instance, the work domain may be relatively broad, whereas exercise may be relatively narrow. One can imagine that the work domain may encompass diverse subdomains, such as school, career and personal projects, whereas a domain like exercise may only encompass aerobic and anaerobic exercise. In sum, our factors should not be considered a complete taxonomy of domains with the same level of bandwidth and specificity.
Third, although the DSIS items were nominated in focus groups as behaviours requiring inhibition, certain items may seem-to some individuals-out of place on an impulsivity scale. For instance, drinking one glass of red wine may be considered healthy. However, many people drink wine for other reasons and, in fact, struggle not to drink too much. Consistent with this observation, each of the DSIS subscales was significantly inversely correlated with a domain-general self-control scale. Moreover, the average temptation rating of 2.75 and perceived harm rating of 3.16 suggest that as a group, DSIS items are generally perceived as being moderately tempting and moderately bad. In addition, the pattern of results was identical when behaviour data points rated as 'not tempting' or 'not bad at all' were excluded from analyses. Furthermore, it is a common practice for impulsivity scales to contain items that do not capture impulsivity or self-control for all individuals. For example, 'I eat healthy foods' for the self-control scale (Tangney et al., 2004) , 'I make up my mind quickly' on the Barratt impulsivity scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) 13 Given the possibility that some participants may implicitly use their own personal minimum and maximum as anchors when rating the frequency of their behaviour (which could inflate within-individual variance), we recruited 106 participants from the Mturk of Amazon.com to complete a version of the DSIS-B that asked 'How many days out of the last seven days did you do the following activities?' The within-individual variance across domains (1.40; 62% of the total variance) was still significantly larger than the between-individual variance (0.86; 38% of the total variance), F(530, 105)=1.62, p=.001. and 'Does the child sit still?' on the self-control rating scale (Kendall & Wilcox, 1979) .
Finally, these studies were cross-sectional and correlational in design. Experimental studies that manipulate temptation or perceived harm should be conducted to establish causal relationships with impulsive behaviour. Future studies should also use longitudinal designs to establish true predictive relationships between the DSIS and theoretically relevant behaviour. Furthermore, although the cross-level interactions in this investigation revealed that more selfcontrolled individuals are better at overcoming their idiosyncratic temptations and refraining from behaviours that they deem harmful, our data do not allow us to determine how or why this occurs. This finding highlights the importance of identifying the specific psychological mechanisms by which impulses are regulated.
Implications
We agree with Epstein and O'Brien (1985) that 'behavior is unquestionably to some extent general and to some extent specific, and one can choose to study one aspect or the other' (p. 513). Unfortunately, researchers most often choose to study the first aspect and disregard the latter entirely. As demonstrated in this investigation, examining domain-specific aspects of behaviour revealed that the influence of context on behaviour is both substantial and systematic. In addition, domain-specific impulsive behaviour provided incremental predictive validity in predicting theoretically relevant outcomes over and beyond domain-general self-control.
Although we place special emphasis on domain specificity, we do not wish to downplay the importance of domaingeneral processes, nor do we claim that domain-specific processes are 'stronger' than domain-general processes. Indeed, this investigation demonstrates the value of domaingeneral self-control in predicting impulsive behaviour over a diverse range of domains. Both aspects are important. We accentuate the domain-specific aspect because it has largely been ignored. Although interest in domain specificity has been increasing (e.g. Goldstein & Weber, 1997; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1994; Weber et al., 2002) , empirical domain-specific studies are still rare. To obtain a more complete understanding of personality, domain specificity must be accounted for instead of ignored. Funder (2009) has pointed out that a focus on withinperson variance across domains begs two questions: 'Where do these patterns come from? How are they important?' (p. 122). Likewise, Mischel and colleagues have asserted, 'By addressing not only the average level of behavior (e.g., overall agreeableness) but also when, where, and with whom it occurs, one can see the individual's distinctive coherent, and systematic patterns of behavior variation and glimpse the psychological processes and person variables that underlie them' (Shoda et al., 1994, p. 686) . We agree with them. Although the standard practice of averaging across domains can obscure important individual differences (Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002) , examining domains as variables of interest can provide a more nuanced and accurate view of personality. As Shoda et al. (1994) , Weber et al. (2002) and the current investigation have demonstrated, psychologically salient aspects of the domain (temptation, in this investigation) can to a large extent explain variance in domain-specific behaviour. Further, we suggest that examining both within-individual and between-individual variance simultaneously can lead to important insights. For example, the cross-level interactions in this investigation revealed that more self-controlled individuals are better at overcoming temptations that they found alluring yet harmful.
Conclusion
This investigation provides an explanation for the variation in impulsive behaviour within individuals across domains: domain-specific impulsive behaviour is a result of domainspecific temptation and, to a lesser extent, perceived harm.
So, why was Tiger Woods impulsive when it came to sex but self-controlled in other domains? One possibility is that Woods did not think that he would be caught (Magary, 2010) and thus did not perceive the harm of his illicit trysts to be very high. The present investigation argues against this possibility. Instead, we suggest that Woods was more tempted to engage in impulsive sexual behaviour than to procrastinate, lose his temper or take drugs. As Oscar Wilde's quote suggests, Woods could resist everything but temptation.
